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Section 1. Documenting globalisation 
1.1. Introduction  
 The period from 1870 to 1914 represented the high water mark of 19th century 
globalization, which, as Chapter 1.4 showed, had been developing since the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars. This chapter will explore several dimensions of this globalization, as well as its 
effects on the European economy. Since the topic is vast, our focus will be on the links between 
Europe and the rest of the world, rather than on the growing integration of the European economy 
itself, although that will be alluded to. 
 Nineteenth century globalization involved increasing transfers of commodities, people, 
capital and ideas between and within continents. The most straightforward measure of integration 
is simply the growing volume of these international flows, perhaps scaled by measures of 
economic activity more generally: for example, the ratio of commodity trade to GDP, or the 
number of migrants per head of population.  Another measure is the cost of moving goods or 
factors of production across borders, and this cost will show up in international price gaps. 
Because it is less easy to measure integration in the international ‘markets’ for ideas and 
technology, these flows are often not discussed in economists’ accounts of globalization, but they 
are sufficiently important that they will be briefly considered here, problems of quantification 
notwithstanding. 
 Having documented the increasing integration of international markets in the late 19th 
century, we then discuss some of the effects of this unprecedented globalization. Finally, we turn 
to the question of how sustainable the relatively liberal 19th century world economy was: could 
globalization have continued unabated after 1914, had World War I not intervened, or were there 
forces that would have undermined open markets even had that cataclysm not occurred? 
 
1.2. Trade, 1870-1914  
European international trade in current values grew at 4.1% a year between 1870 and 
1913, as against 16.1% a year between 1830 and 1870.2 In 1990 prices, European international 
trade grew at 6.8% a year (Maddison 2001, p. 362), with growth being particularly high in 
Belgium, Germany, Switzerland and Finland (Table 1.1). The European trade to GDP ratio, 
including intra-European trade, increased from 29.9% to 36.9%, while excluding intra-European 
trade it increased from 9.2% to 13.5% (Table 1.2), slightly more than the United States figure 
(12% in 1913). 
                                                          
2 Bairoch (1976), p. 77; Prados de la Escosura (2000) and personal communication with the 
author. 
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 Price evidence also shows impressive international integration during this period.  
Between 1870 and 1913, the wheat price gap between Liverpool and Chicago fell from 57.6% to 
15.6%, and the London-Cincinnati bacon price gap fell from 92.5% to 17.9%.  The period also 
saw US-British price gaps for industrial goods such as cotton textiles, iron bars, pig iron and 
copper falling from 13.7% to -3.6%, 75% to 20.6%, 85.2% to 19.3% and 32.7% to -0.1% 
respectively (O'Rourke and Williamson 1994).  Prices also converged between Europe and Asia, 
with the London-Rangoon rice price gap falling from 93% to 26%, and the Liverpool-Bombay 
cotton price gap falling from 57% to 20% (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007 , pp.  404-405). However, 
both Federico and Persson (2007) and Jacks (2005) point out that grain price convergence was if 
anything more impressive between 1830 or 1840 and 1870 than between 1870 and 1913.   
International trade grew for many reasons. International freight rates declined steadily as 
a result of constant technical improvements and the growth in the usage of faster and more 
regular steamships, especially after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 (which could only be 
used by steamships). However, as overland transport was much more expensive than water 
transport, the reduction of internal transport costs through the development of railways was 
crucial (Figure 1.1). As a percentage of the Chicago wheat price, the cost of shipping wheat to 
New York declined from 17.2% to 5.5% , while the cost of shipping it from New York to 
Liverpool fell from 11.6% to 4.7% (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007, p.  382). Railroads were 
particularly important in large countries such as Russia (Metzer 1974). 
 In addition, peace between the main powers between 1871 and 1914 promoted trade 
(Jacks 2006). The development of European formal and informal empires increased extra-
European trade through the reduction of trade barriers, the inclusion of colonies in currency 
unions, and the better protection of (European) property rights (Mitchener and Weidenmier 
(2007). Meanwhile, the gradual spread of the gold standard dampened exchange rate fluctuations 
and reduced uncertainty in trade. Whether international currency arrangements such as the Latin 
Monetary Union (LMU) and Scandinavian Monetary Union (SMU) had an additional positive 
effect on trade is a matter of controversy (López-Córdova and Meissner 2003, Estevadeordal et 
al. 2003, Flandreau and Maurel 2005).  
 Falling transport costs implied increasing potential market integration, but politicians 
always had the possibility of muting or even reversing this via protectionist policies. Beginning in 
the 1870s Continental European countries raised barriers to trade in grain and other commodities 
(Bairoch 1989). Thus, Federico and Persson (2007) show that while grain prices converged 
among free trade countries during our period, this was more than counterbalanced by a substantial 
increase in price dispersion between free trade and protectionist countries. 
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 As regards the pattern of trade, Europe as a whole was a net exporter of manufactures and 
a net importer of primary products, although this masks important differences between regions. 
At one extreme lay the United Kingdom, massively dependent on imported food and raw 
materials paid for with exports of manufactures and services. The rest of Northwestern Europe 
had a similar but less extreme specialization. Eastern and Southern Europe, however, despite a 
growing industrialization, still exported primary products and imported manufactures, net. The 
overall European deficit in commodity trade was partly balanced by net exports of services. To 
give an idea of their magnitude, the United Kingdom surplus in business services trade averaged 
over $800 million during 1911-13, as compared with a figure for total European exports of $11 
billion in 1913 (Imlah 1952). 
 
1.3. Capital flows, 1870-1914  
 International capital market integration was extremely impressive during this period. 
Europe was the world’s banker (Feis 1930), and those regions with good access to European 
capital and abundant resources such as the US, Canada, Argentina and Australia prospered most 
between 1870 and 1913. There was also a smaller, but still important, transfer of capital from the 
Western European core to the more peripheral economies of South, Central and Eastern Europe.  
For the UK, Edelstein (2004, p. 193) estimates that 32% of net national wealth was held 
overseas in 1913. This reflects four decades in which foreign investment as a percentage of 
(domestic) savings averaged roughly one third (Table 1.3). The UK committed, on average, some 
4% of its GDP to capital formation abroad over a period of more than 40 years, an unprecedented 
phenomenon. Europe as a whole dominated foreign investment. In 1914, England (42%), France 
(20%) and Germany (13%), Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland combined accounted for 
87% of total foreign investment (Maddison 1995, p. 65).  
  Capital market integration has traced out a U-shape over the past 150 years (Obstfeld and 
Taylor 2004), with late 19th century integration being followed by interwar disintegration and a 
slow move towards reintegration in the late 20th century.  According to Obstfeld and Taylor 
(2004, p. 55), foreign assets accounted for 7% of world GDP in 1870, but for nearly 20% during 
1900-14.  The figure was only 8% in 1930, 5% in 1945, and still only 6% in 1960. However, it 
then shot up to 25% in 1980, 49% in 1990, and 92% in 2000. On this measure it was not until 
some time in the 1970s that the pre-1914 level of integration was recouped. Another measure of 
integration was suggested by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). International capital mobility breaks 
the link between domestic savings and domestic investment, as domestic savings can be invested 
abroad and domestic investment can be financed externally. Consequently, the weaker the 
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relationship between domestic savings and domestic investment, the higher is international capital 
mobility.  The U-shaped pattern emerges yet again from the data. A third measure looks at bond 
spreads. Bond spreads between peripheral economies, be they in Europe or not, and England, 
France, and Germany fell, on average, from some 5% in 1870 to only 1% in 1914 (Flandreau and 
Zumer 2004).  Mauro et al. (2002) have shown that emerging market bond spreads then were, on 
average, less than half of what they were in the 1990s, which demonstrates just how safe 
investors perceived foreign investment to be at the time. 
 Capital market integration was not a continuous process. As is true today, there were 
reversals which subjected capital-receiving countries to ‘sudden stops’ (Calvo 1998).  A first 
wave of financial integration came to an end with the Baring crisis of 1891. Capital receded 
dramatically for roughly a decade before massive foreign lending resumed again around the turn 
of the century.  
 What explains late 19th century capital market integration? The absence of military 
conflict among the main lending countries between the Franco-Prussian War and World War I 
certainly helped create and stabilise an atmosphere conducive to foreign lending.  Another 
political explanation, by contrast, has been highly controversial. Marxists have long argued that 
late 19th century capital exports and imperialism are only two sides of the same coin: excessive 
saving at home, generated by a highly unequal distribution of income, required outlets in 
underdeveloped countries, as domestic investment would have been subject to Marx’s law of the 
falling rate of profit. This idea associated with J.A. Hobson allowed Lenin to declare imperialism 
to be the highest stage of capitalism. The contention of a connection between empire and capital 
exports was subsequently discredited, to be resuscitated recently by revisionist historians arguing 
for a more benign interpretation of imperialism. For example, Ferguson and Schularick (2006) 
argue that members of the British Empire benefited from their colonial status through 
substantially reduced interest rates, presumably as a result of more secure property rights. But 
Table 1.4 raises doubts about whether colonial affiliation mattered for the size and the direction 
of capital flows. All English colonies combined (excluding Canada, Australia and New Zealand) 
received a paltry 16.9% of English capital exports, which is less than what the US alone received 
(20.5%). The French and German experiences suggest the same, with colonies receiving only 
8.9% and 2.6%, respectively, of the overall capital exports of their respective mother countries. 
 Turning to economic institutions and policies, a great deal of attention has been devoted 
to the gold standard (Bordo and Rockoff 1996) and, more recently, to sound fiscal policies 
(Flandreau and Zumer 2004). Adherence to gold is seen as having promoted global financial 
integration in two ways. First, it eliminated exchange-rate risk. Second, it signalled that the 
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government concerned would pursue conservative fiscal and monetary policies, which assured 
potential investors that returns were reasonably safe. 
 While economic institutions and policies can facilitate capital imports, they can never 
attract them if there is no genuine interest on the part of investors in what a specific country has to 
offer. This brings us to economic fundamentals as the main determinant in explaining the size and 
direction of flows. Over 50% of British capital exports went to areas of recent settlement (Table 
1.4) where natural resources could be exploited, not to where labour was cheap (Africa and Asia). 
If New World land was to produce food for European consumers, and raw materials for factories, 
railways had to make it accessible, land had to be improved, and housing and infrastructure had to 
be provided for the new frontier communities. Clemens and Williamson (2004) provide 
econometric evidence in favour of this view, showing that British capital exports went to 
countries with abundant supplies of natural resources, immigrants, and young, educated, urban 
populations. While they also find that the gold standard and empire promoted foreign investment, 
supply and demand, rather than the presence or absence of frictions leading to price gaps between 
markets, were what was really crucial. The French and the German cases appear somewhat 
different and await further investigation. While foreign investment in Africa and Asia was rather 
unpopular in all three countries, France and Germany sent 61.1% and 53.3%, respectively, of 
their capital exports to other European countries. Investment in areas of recent settlement, by 
contrast, played a substantially reduced role for both countries. 
 
1.4. Migration, 1870-1914  
 It is in the area of migration that the late 19th century was most impressively globalized, 
even compared with today. At the beginning of the century, intercontinental migration was still 
dominated by slavery: during the 1820s, free immigration into the Americas averaged only 
15,380 per annum, about a quarter of the annual slave inflow. Twenty years later, the free inflow 
was more than four times as high as the slave flow, at 178,530 per annum (Chiswick and Hatton 
2003, p.68), and the numbers rose to more than a million per annum after 1900 (Figure 1.2), with 
Italians and Eastern Europeans adding to the traditional outflow from northwest Europe. Some of 
the country-specific migration rates were enormous (Table 1.5): during the 1880s, the decadal 
emigration rate per thousand was 141.7 in Ireland, and 95.2 in Norway, while an emigration rate 
of 107.7 per thousand was recorded in Italy in the first decade of the 20th century. It should be 
noted that these figures are gross, not net, and that the extent of return migration varied over time 
and across countries, rising from about 10% of the outflow initially to around 30% at the turn of 
the century (ibid, p. 70). While return migration was significant among Italians and Greeks, for 
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example, it was very low among other groups, such as the Irish or Eastern European Jews.  In 
addition to these transoceanic migrations, there were significant migrations within Europe, for 
example from Italy to France, and from Ireland to Britain. The average Western European annual 
outmigration rate was 2.2 per thousand in the 1870s and 5.4 per thousand for the 1900s, very 
large numbers that are far in excess of any reasonable projections of African emigration between 
now and 2030 (Hatton and Williamson 2005, p. 261), although the latter would presumably be far 
higher than they actually are in the absence of today's very tight immigration restrictions in rich 
countries. 
 The causes of this mass migration are by now well understood (Hatton and Williamson 
1998, 2005). On one level, the causes are obvious: the New World was endowed with a higher 
land-labour ratio than Europe, and hence American and Australian workers earned higher wages 
than their European counterparts. British real wages in 1870 were less than 60% of wages in the 
New World destinations relevant to British workers, whereas the equivalent figure for Irish 
workers was just 44%, and for Norwegian workers just 26% (Hatton and Williamson 2005, p. 
55). The gains from migration were thus potentially enormous, and once the new steam 
technologies had lowered the cost of travel sufficiently, mass emigration became inevitable. This 
was particularly so since 19th century immigration policy was relatively liberal, notwithstanding 
the policy developments which we will note later on. 
 On another level, there is the issue of what determined the timing of emigration streams 
from different European countries: why did emigration from relatively rich countries such as 
Britain take off before emigration from poorer countries such as Italy, where the gains to migrants 
were presumably higher? What explains the fact that so few French emigrated, while so many 
Irish and Italians left? What explains the initial rise, and subsequent decline, of emigration rates 
in several countries, documented in Table 1.5? Hatton and Williamson provide a simple 
explanation for all these questions, which can be represented in Figure 1.3. EM is a downward-
sloping function relating emigration rates from a given European economy to home wage rates: as 
home wages rise, emigration rates should fall, ceteris paribus. The initial rise in emigration rates 
experienced in the typical economy (say from e0 to e1) must then have been due to rightward 
shifts in the emigration function, from EM to EM’, since wages were rising (say from W0 to W1), 
not falling, in late 19th century Europe. In turn, such rightward shifts were caused by a variety of 
factors. First, would-be emigrants were initially constrained by the cost of trans-oceanic transport, 
but as transport costs fell, more migrants were able to leave their homelands. Second, these 
poverty traps could also be overcome by previous emigrants sending home remittances or pre-
paid tickets, thus directly financing the cost of travel. Emigration rates thus tended to increase as 
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countries built up stocks of emigrants overseas, the so-called "friend and relatives" effect. Third, 
fertility rates were on the rise throughout Europe during this period, leading to an increase in the 
supply of young, mobile adults. And finally, it has often been argued that the industrialisation 
documented in Chapter 3 led to workers being detached from the land, again increasing their 
mobility. 
 Rising fertility, structural transformation and falling transport costs thus increased 
emigration rates, initially in the richer economies whose workers could best afford the cost of 
transport, and then in poorer economies as living standards rose across the continent. This 
emigration was initially self-reinforcing, as a result of the friends and relatives effect: all these 
factors led to EM shifting rightwards. But eventually, the emigration function stabilised, and 
when this happened, emigration became self-limiting: by lowering labour supply at home, it 
pushed up real wages (say from W1 to W2), and economies thus moved up their EM schedules, 
experiencing lower emigration rates (e2). Hatton and Williamson show that low French and high 
Irish emigration rates can be explained on economic grounds alone without appealing to cultural 
behaviour in either country, since this one-size-fits-all European model explains most countries 
satisfactorily. Thus, high Irish emigration rates can be explained by the Famine of the 1840s, 
which created a large Irish migrant stock in the New World, while low French rates can be 
explained by such factors as a precocious fertility transition. Economic rationality turns out to do 
a pretty good job of explaining European emigration during this period. 
 
1.5. Trade in knowledge, 1870-1914  
 Economic globalization is not simply about the movement of goods or factors of 
production. It also includes technological transfers and the deepening of other intellectual 
exchanges. 
 Technology circulated relatively freely in the late 19th century. In Europe and in the 
Atlantic world, despite laws forbidding the emigration of skilled workers (repealed in the United 
Kingdom in 1825) and machinery exports (repealed there in 1842), technologies had been 
circulating for a long time. Textile mills around the world used similar machines, often imported 
from Britain (Clark 1987). Ship building, iron and steel, telegraph and telephone technologies 
transferred quickly, unless slowed by adaptation issues. Europe was internally exchanging new 
technologies, diffusing them – both to European offshoots and to the rest of the world –and 
receiving new technologies, mainly from the United States. Japan was an especially keen learner 
(Jeremy 1991). 
 Several new factors increased the speed and the reach of technological transfers. 
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Migration was easy. Imperialism allowed European entrepreneurs to invest overseas, taking 
advantage of low wages, with no fear of expropriation by hostile governments. The decline in 
transport and communication costs helped the diffusion of ideas, new goods and machines. This 
last effect was especially important because more and more technology was embedded in 
machines rather than in individual know-how, even if training was still necessary. Firms could 
now export capital goods on a large scale. For example, Platt, a Lancashire firm, exported at least 
50 % of their cotton spinning machines between 1845 and 1870 (Clark and Feenstra 2003). 
Explicit policies aiming at import substitution encouraged domestic technological emulation with 
mixed success. Japan was able to replace its English suppliers of textile machinery, but France 
had difficulties in replacing its American telephone suppliers, and had to postpone the diffusion 
of this important technology. 
 To circumvent these restrictions and better protect their intellectual property, several 
firms set up production in foreign countries and transformed themselves into multinationals 
during this period. Sometimes, the motive was to produce inside protected markets: for example, 
by 1911 International Harvester was producing harvesting machines in France, Germany, Russia 
and Sweden as a result of those countries’ protectionist policies (Wilkins 1970, pp. 102-3). 
Ericsson, a Swedish firm, and Western Electrics, an American firm, both had to establish 
overseas branch plants in order to win telephone contracts in various European countries 
(Foreman-Peck 1991). Sometimes direct foreign investment arose simply because, as the theory 
of the firm predicts, it proved difficult or impossible to transfer intangible assets such as new 
technologies abroad at ‘arms length’, via the market: thus, Singer’s attempts to profit from its 
invention of the sewing machine by licensing the technology to a French merchant proved a 
complete disaster, the latter refusing to pay what he owed, or even disclose how many sewing 
machines he was producing (Wilkins, pp. 38-9). 
 The diffusion of technologies was also helped by the creation of international scientific 
and technical organizations. The Institution of Naval Architects was founded in 1860 in the 
United Kingdom, but organized meetings in different countries and through its membership 
created an international network of professional and learned bodies (Ville 1991). The number of 
international scientific conferences and organizations increased dramatically (Figure 1.4). 
Paradoxically however, at the same time, science was seen as one of the weapons in the struggle 
between European nations. Besides straightforward military applications, academic activity was 
used a diplomatic weapon. Inviting foreign scientists and participating in scientific congresses 
was part and parcel of the rivalry between France and Germany, as each hoped to tighten their 
links with allied and neutral countries, especially the United States (Charle 1994, ch. 8). 
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 Governments increased formal technical cooperation. The International Telegraph Union 
was founded in 1865 and the Universal Postal Union in 1874. Humanitarian cooperation was 
expanded as well: the Red Cross was founded in 1863 and the first Geneva Convention signed in 
1864. Most sovereign states, both European and non-European, joined these global institutions. 
Another form of rising globalization was the growing number of international exchanges and 
competitions. The World Fairs were official showcases for the technical prowess of each nation. 
The 1876 World Fair in Philadelphia was the first not to take place in Europe, and included 
official exhibitions from Japan and China. The first Venice Biennale took place in 1895. The 
modern Olympics began in 1896. The first five Nobel prizes were awarded in 1901. 
 Labour movements were increasingly globalized as well. Socialist ideals rejected 
nationalism and advocated the international defence of the interests of labour. The first 
international was founded in 1864 and the second in 1889, the latter having Japanese and Turkish 
members. The significance of these events is difficult to assess. International, especially pan-
European, scientific and cultural cooperation between individuals had existed for a long time. De 
facto agreements about the rules of war and the management of public goods – e.g. the high seas 
– pre-dated the first globalization. To some extent, the heyday of elite cultural globalization was 
before 1870. Nationalist cultural identities gained in importance in the second half of the 19th 
century, leading to the fragmentation of cultural activities as they became more popular. The 
formalisation of international cultural and scientific cooperation can be seen as an attempt to 
counteract the rise of nationalism, but in the end it was too weak for the task. 
 
Section 2.  The effects of globalisation 
2.1. Globalization and factor price convergence 
 As we have seen, the late 19th century was characterised by booming commodity trade 
and mass migration from the Old World to the New. How did this influence income distribution 
within and between countries? 
 Let us begin with trade. According to Heckscher-Ohlin logic, the land-abundant and 
labour-scarce New World should have exchanged food and raw materials for European 
manufactured goods, and trade should have led to the wage-rental ratio, w/r, converging 
internationally. In New World economies, where w/r was high, w/r should have declined, as 
farmers exported more, and manufacturing suffered from foreign competition. In land-scarce 
European economies, where w/r was low, it should have increased, as workers were hired by 
expanding manufacturing industries, and land rents were undermined by cheap food imports. 
Furthermore, trade should have led to absolute factor price convergence, with low European 
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wages catching up on high New World wages, and expensive European land falling in price 
relative to cheap New World land. 
 By and large, these predictions hold good for the late 19th century (O’Rourke and 
Williamson 1999). Between 1870 and 1910, real land prices fell in countries such as Britain, 
France and Sweden -- in Britain by over 50% -- while land prices soared in the New World. 
Furthermore, the 40 years after 1870 saw substantial relative factor price convergence, with 
wage-rental ratios rising in Europe, and falling in the New World (Williamson 2002a, Table 4, p. 
74).  Between 1870 and 1910, the ratio increased by a factor of 2.7 in Britain, 5.6 in Ireland, 2.6 
in Sweden, and 3.1 in Denmark. The increase was less pronounced in protectionist economies: the 
ratio increased by a factor of 2.0 in France, 1.4 in Germany, and not at all in Spain. This suggests 
a link between trade and factor price trends, which is confirmed by both econometric evidence 
and CGE simulations. In turn, these wage-rental ratio trends implied that the European income 
distribution was becoming more equal, since landowners were typically better off than unskilled 
workers.  
 In addition to these Heckscher-Ohlin predictions, there was a more mundane reason why 
declining transport costs were good for European workers. In an era where a large fraction of 
labourers’ budgets was still spent on food, cheaper transport meant cheaper food, and thus higher 
real wages. What was bad for farmers was directly beneficial to urban workers, then as now, 
which explains why, by and large, socialist parties tended to support free trade in Europe.  British 
workers should have particularly benefited from free trade: not only did it lower the price of food, 
but any negative impact on agricultural labour demand would have only a small effect on the 
overall labour market, given agriculture’s small share in overall employment there (just 22.6% in 
1871). O’Rourke and Williamson (1994) estimate that British real wages rose by 43% between 
1870 and 1913, and that no fewer than twenty percentage points of this increase can be directly 
attributed to declining transport costs. On the other hand, in more agricultural economies the net 
impact of cheap grain on wages could have been negative, if it sufficiently depressed agricultural 
employment and wages. 
 Migration was the dimension of globalization that had the greatest impact on European 
workers’ living standards during this period. Figure 1.5 shows the (PPP-adjusted) wages of 
unskilled male urban workers in three countries of mass emigration, Ireland, Italy and Norway, 
relative to wages in the leading European economy of the day, Britain. Between 1870 and 1910, 
emigration lowered the labour force by 45% in Ireland , by 39% in Italy, and by 24% in Norway 
(O’Rourke and Williamson 1999, Table 8.1). The figure shows that living standards in these three 
economies rose more rapidly than in Britain. In Ireland, real wages rose from 73% to 92% of the 
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British level during this period, while Norwegian wages rose from 48% to 95%. In Italy there was 
no convergence until the turn of the century, which is when Italian emigration rates exploded; 
thereafter, real Italian wages rose from 40% of British wages in 1900 to 56% in 1913. Similarly, 
Norwegian wages continually converged on US wages, while Italian wages converged after 1900; 
Irish wages converged over the period as a whole, although very rapid US growth in the final two 
decades of the period implied Irish divergence after 1895 or so. 
 Both econometric and simulation studies show that emigration was an important source 
of living standard convergence for countries such as Ireland. To what extent can these findings be 
generalised? Taylor and Williamson (1997) calculate the labour market impact of migration in 17 
Atlantic economy countries between 1870 and 1910.  They find that emigration raised Irish wages 
by 32%, Italian by 28% and Norwegian by 10%. International real wage dispersion fell by 28% 
between 1870 and 1910, reflecting a convergence of poorer countries on the rich, but in the 
absence of the mass migrations international real wage dispersion would have increased by 7%. 
Wage gaps between New World and Old in fact declined from 108 to 85% during the period, but 
in the absence of the mass migrations they would have risen to 128% in 1910. The results suggest 
that more than all (125%) of the real wage convergence between 1870 and 1910 was attributable 
to migration. Even when allowance is made for the possibility that capital may have chased 
labour, lowering the impact of migration on capital-labour ratios, migration emerges as a major 
determinant of living standards convergence, explaining about 70% of the convergence. Mass 
migration accounted for all of Ireland’s and Italy’s convergence on the United States, and for 65-
87% of their convergence on Britain. The biggest lesson of 19th century migration history is that 
emigration is of major benefit to poor economies (Williamson 2002b). 
 
2.2. Capital flows, peripheral development and core welfare 
 Assuming identical production functions with capital and labour as the only inputs, lower 
wages in the European periphery should have been due to lower capital-to-labour ratios, which in 
turn should have implied higher returns to capital. Did the European periphery attract capital 
imports as this logic suggests, and, if so, did these capital imports have the desired effect of 
raising the capital-to-labour ratio and hence wages? 
 We shall start with Sweden, one of the few cases for which we have relatively reliable 
data. Capital imports after 1870 served to make the Swedish capital stock 50% bigger than it 
would have been in their absence, increasing Swedish real wages by 25% (O’Rourke and 
Williamson 1999). Sweden may have been the European country that benefited most from capital 
imports before World War I. Denmark and Norway also benefited, albeit on a reduced scale as 
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capital imports were substantially smaller. 
 These results cannot be easily replicated for other countries in the European periphery, as 
a result of poor or contradictory data. This may be illustrated with reference to Austria-Hungary, 
by far the largest peripheral economy in pre-1914 Europe bar Russia. Looking from the “outside”, 
i.e. considering the foreign investment of the European core countries, the dual monarchy seems 
to have enjoyed substantial capital imports (Table 1.4). A recent reconstruction of the Austro-
Hungarian balance-of-payments, by contrast, concluded that, over the period 1880-1913, Austria-
Hungary exported rather than imported capital (Morys 2006). Similar uncertainty surrounds the 
Italian, Spanish and Portuguese cases, while there are indications that Ireland, another peripheral 
economy, also exported capital after 1870. 
 Even if some of the peripheral economies might turn out on closer examination to have 
imported capital, the general question remains: Why was the European periphery not able to 
attract more capital from the European core? This is the 19th century equivalent of the Lucas 
paradox: capital usually flows to rich rather than to poor countries today, despite the fact that 
wages are lower in poor countries (Lucas 1990). Three explanations have been offered for late 
19th century Europe. First, lower labour productivity in the European periphery can potentially 
explain why capital did not flow there (Clark 1987). However, this only begs the question as to 
why labour productivity was lower in the European periphery. Second, non-adherence to gold 
might have dissuaded foreign investors. In support of the latter theory, the Scandinavian countries 
had the best record of adherence to gold among the peripheral economies. And finally, it may 
simply be that these countries were not as attractive to investors as the land-abundant New World. 
We now turn to the capital exporting core countries and ask what were the effects of 
capital flows on welfare levels there. Superficially, the answer seems straightforward. As 
investors preferred foreign investment opportunities to domestic ones based on their relative 
profitability, capital exports should have been beneficial to the core countries, lowering GDP 
(output) but raising GNP (income). However, some have argued that channelling funds abroad 
could have harmed the domestic economy.  The 1931 Macmillan Report claimed that the City of 
London systematically discriminated against domestic borrowers, preferring instead to invest 
overseas. British industry, starved of capital, grew more slowly than it would otherwise have 
done. In other words, to the long debated question as to why late Victorian Britain failed (as 
measured by its growth performance relative to the US and Germany, its main economic rivals at 
the time) another debate was added: Did late Victorian capital markets fail? 
 In a monumental study, Edelstein (1982) showed that overseas portfolio investments 
yielded a higher realized return than domestic portfolio investment during 1870 – 1913. This 
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result was true even when adjusting for risk. While this finding exculpated late Victorian and 
Edwardian investors (see also Goetzmann and Ukhov 2006), the question still lingered as to 
whether Britain could have done better by retaining more savings in the domestic economy, for 
example by imposing a tax on capital exports (Temin 1987). But here one has to question what 
were the real constraints facing the British economy at the time. Research has shown that 
entrepreneurs had strong internal sources of funding and easy access to local, provincial 
financing. Rather, what was missing was the highly skilled workforce required to take full 
advantage of the opportunities offered by the Second Industrial Revolution. Restrictions on 
overseas capital exports almost certainly would not have been the best way to encourage 
domestic, scientifically based industry; publicly supported general and technical education might 
have been.  
 The debate on the alleged trade-off between capital exports and domestic industry has 
also frequently neglected the positive externalities of European overseas investments benefiting 
European consumers. Since much of the investment went into the construction of railways and 
other social overhead projects, it implied cheaper imports of food stuff and raw materials, which 
represented a major contribution to European core welfare. 
 
2.3. Imperialism and European welfare 
 In 1880, European colonies (not including any part of Russia) ranged over 24.5 million 
square kilometres and had 312 millions inhabitants. In 1913, they totalled 52.5 million square 
kilometres, more than a third of the earth’s land surface, and had 525 millions inhabitants. The 
United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal had been colonial powers for a 
long time. Belgium, Germany and Italy now joined them. The United Kingdom controlled 93% of 
the surface and 87% of the population of these colonized territories (including dominions) in 
1880, and 61% and 71% of the surface and population respectively in 1913 (Etemad 2006). 
 As noted earlier, Lenin, inspired by Hobson and others, suggested that the mature 
European economic system could only be sustained through imperialism. These arguments have 
been discredited. Capital exports to colonies were important, but not dominant. Europe was self-
sufficient in coal and nearly self-sufficient in iron ore and other minerals. Textile raw materials 
were more of an issue as cotton, for example, could not be produced in Europe in great quantities; 
but it was largely supplied by the United States.  Colonial empires did not represent vital outlets 
for European goods either, absorbing less than 15% of all Western European exports (Bairoch 
1993). 
 Yet, it is true that one of the driving forces behind imperialism was the influence of 
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European traders, who saw in political control a way to facilitate their economic exchanges with 
African and Asian producers and consumers. Some industrialists also believed that the creation of 
a reserved market would be a suitable answer to international competition, and they managed to 
convince certain politicians, like Joseph Chamberlain (British Colonial Secretary from 1895 to 
1903), Jules Ferry (French Prime Minister from 1880 to 1881 and from 1883 to 1885) and 
Francesco Crispi (Italian Prime Minister from 1887 to 1891 and from 1893 to 1896). 
 It is not certain that empires represented a net benefit for the European powers. The 
debate has centred on the British Empire as it was by far the largest, and was the only empire 
controlling economically advanced settler colonies. According to Davis and Huttenback (1986, p. 
107), private British investment in the empire after 1880 yielded higher returns than did 
investment in the domestic economy, but smaller returns than investments in foreign countries. 
The direct cost of empires was limited, as the United Kingdom, like the other colonizers, tried to 
have its colonies pay for themselves and provided mainly disaster relief, funds for military 
campaigns, and shipping and cable subsidies. The indirect military cost was more important 
since, India excepted, the British Empire contributed very little to general military spending. 
While all these points have been extensively debated, the final word must go to Avner Offer 
(1993), who makes the obviously correct point that the military "debts" of the French and British 
empires were paid in full during the First World War. 
 To determine the effect of empire on European economic welfare, it is crucial to decide 
on the appropriate counterfactual (Edelstein 2004). Without formal imperialism, would Africa, 
Canada, South Asia and Oceania have been as developed as they actually were, but with the 
ability to erect high tariff barriers against European exports, as did the United States? Or would 
they have been substantially less developed and less involved with the world economy? Was the 
alternative to a British Canada the United States, or Argentina? In the absence of empire, would 
the African states (as some imperialists feared) have remained independent backward territories, 
mostly closed to foreign trade like Ethiopia? Depending on the answer to such questions, 
Edelstein has shown that the benefits of empire for the United Kingdom might have been 
somewhere between 0.4% and 6.8% of its GDP in 1913, up from -0.2% to 4.5% in 1870. These 
figures probably overestimate the benefits of imperial trade, as Edelstein supposes that there 
would have been no re-direction of trade to compensate for lower imperial demand, but they do 
not take into account any impact of empire in facilitating emigration from the United Kingdom, 
especially to Oceania. No such calculation has been made for other European countries. Their 
empires were much smaller, but, as they were not committed to free trade, they could manipulate 
the terms of trade to maximize their commercial profits. For example, Portugal gained foreign 
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currency from re-exporting African products through Lisbon. The net result was different for each 
country, but on the whole, whether positive or negative, it was probably small compared to the 
size of domestic economies (O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura 1998). 
 Even if the global economic effect of empires was small, they might have had an 
important redistributive role. Certainly, the military and state apparatus benefited everywhere, 
while there was an obvious cost to taxpayers. In the United Kingdom, Cain and Hopkins (2001) 
have argued that the economic benefits of imperialism accrued mainly to “gentlemanly 
capitalists”, the financial and rentier interests of London and South-East England, to the detriment 
of more “modern” forces in the country such as industrial entrepreneurs. Elsewhere, some 
industrial exporting groups certainly benefited as well. On the whole, the European benefits from 
imperialism were small and uncertain. More importantly, they were probably smaller than the 
costs of imperialism for colonized countries, although this remains an under-explored field of 
research. 
 
Section 3.  Globalization backlash 
3.1. Trade 
 While 19th century European trade policy trends initially reinforced the impact of falling 
transport costs (Chapter 1.4), this changed after the 1870s as a result of the growing impact of 
intercontinental trade on factor prices. As we have seen, trade hurt European landed interests, and 
wherever these were powerful enough, the legislative reaction was predictable. In Germany, 
Bismarck protected both agriculture and industry in 1879; in France, tariffs were raised in the 
1880s, and again in 1892; in Sweden, agricultural protection was re-imposed in 1888 and 
industrial protection was increased in 1892; in Italy, moderate tariffs were imposed in 1878, 
followed by more severe tariffs in 1887. As a grain-exporter, Russia hardly feared free trade in 
agricultural products, but it was the first to backtrack from what had in any event been a rather 
half-hearted liberalization, increasing tariffs substantially in 1877, 1885 and again in 1891. The 
purpose was to stimulate industrialization, and tariffs were combined with export subsidies for 
cotton textile producers. Austria-Hungary and Spain also sharply increased protectionism in the 
1870s or 1880s. The Balkan countries had inherited liberal tariff policies from their Ottoman 
masters, but they too gradually moved towards higher protection, albeit at a slower pace than the 
Germans or Russians. The Ottomans themselves were allowed to slowly raise their tariffs, which 
reached 11% on the eve of the Great War (Bairoch 1989). 
 Some small countries remained relatively liberal: the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, 
and Denmark, which transformed itself from a grain-exporter to a grain-importing exporter of 
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animal products. The United Kingdom also maintained free trade, despite the efforts of Joseph 
Chamberlain.  What explains these exceptions? Economic considerations were surely important: 
countries such as Denmark and the United Kingdom which retained agricultural free trade were 
less vulnerable to the price and rent reductions which globalization implied. In the Danish case 
grain prices had been low to begin with, while the country was exceptionally well suited to meet 
the growing British demand for butter, eggs and bacon, in part due to the success of its 
cooperative societies. In the British case, agriculture had already shrunk significantly, and further 
decline had little impact on the overall economy. Elsewhere, globalization undermined itself. 
Moreover, this switch towards agricultural protectionism would turn out to be permanent, the 
precursor of today's Common Agricultural Policy. 
 
3.2. Immigration 
 While emigration benefited European workers, mass immigration hurt their counterparts 
overseas. Hatton and Williamson (1998) show that immigration lowered unskilled wages in the 
United States, although this is a ceteris paribus finding, since economic growth was raising living 
standards generally during this period. Nonetheless, the effects were large. Relative to what they 
would have been in its absence, immigration lowered unskilled real wages by 8% in the US, 15% 
in Canada, and 21% in Argentina (Taylor and Williamson 1997). Counterfactual or not, such 
impacts did not go unnoticed, and the result was a political backlash, resulting in gradually 
tightening restrictions on immigration in the main destination countries (Timmer and Williamson 
1998). For example, in 1888 the United States banned all Chinese immigration for twenty years, 
while in 1891 it banned the immigration of persons “likely to become public charges” as well as 
those “assisted” in passage (ibid., p. 765). The screw continued to be tightened on immigration 
until 1917, when a literacy test was imposed on would-be migrants, effectively blocking much of 
the low-skilled immigration of the day. Very similar trends can be discerned in Canada and 
Argentina. This shift away from a relatively laisser faire immigration policy implied that interwar 
European economies no longer had the emigration safety valve that had helped sustain living 
standards during the population boom and slow transition to modern growth of the late 19th 
century. 
 
3.3. Democracy, the gold standard and capital flows  
 Global financial integration collapsed virtually overnight in the summer of 1914. Does it 
follow that pre-war levels of capital market integration would necessarily have been sustained in 
the absence of war? 
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 Widespread – by 1913 almost universal – adherence to the gold standard was a central 
pillar of the pre-World War I financial system.  This implied a commitment to a policy of external 
balance, even when that conflicted with domestic economic imbalances, notably unemployment. 
According to Eichengreen (1992), one of the factors undermining attempts to reinstate the gold 
standard after 1918 was the fact that the war had given a boost to the extension of the franchise, 
and thus to workers’ political power: it was no longer clear that gold standard discipline – i.e. 
raising the discount rate when needed – would be adhered to if this conflicted with domestic 
policy objectives. However, Eichengreen also notes that the franchise was already being extended 
before the war in many countries, and that unemployment was becoming a growing social issue. 
One can therefore speculate that, even in the absence of war, democratisation would have 
ultimately succeeded in undermining the gold standard, and with it the foundations of the pre-war 
international financial system. Indeed, one could even interpret the extension of franchise as 
being in part a consequence of late 19th century globalization, which gave rise to countervailing 
calls to regulate the market (Polanyi 1944). To this extent, one might yet again see globalization -
- the extension of the market -- as having undermined itself. 
 Several objections could be raised against such reasoning, however. First, the single 
largest push for universal suffrage and democratisation came, as Eichengreen says, in the wake of 
World War I, not as a result of globalisation. Second, even if the gold standard had proved 
unsustainable, this would not necessarily have implied the end of global financial integration.  
Today, most capital circulates among rich countries which are (with the notable exception of the 
Eurozone) no longer connected by fixed exchange rates. Indeed, as Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) 
point out, abandoning fixed exchange rates makes it possible for countries to pursue both 
independent monetary policies and a commitment to open capital markets. It was the attempt to 
combine fixed exchange rates with Keynesian macroeconomic policies which, in their view, 
condemned Bretton Woods capital markets. 
 
3.4. Domestic policy responses 
 There were thus powerful political forces undermining late 19th century globalisation. 
However, European governments of this period did not just face a binary choice between open 
and closed international markets, between resisting or giving into protectionist anti-globalization 
backlashes. Rather, there was a range of complementary domestic policies which governments 
could – and did – put in place during this period in order to shore up support for liberal 
international policies. Thus, Huberman and Lewchuk (2003) show that there was extensive 
government intervention in European labour markets in the late 19th century, a period that also 
Guillaume Daudin, Matthias Morys, Kevin H. O’Rourke 
 18
saw a sustained rise in social transfers and the beginnings of what eventually evolved into the 
modern welfare state (Lindert 2004). A range of labour market regulations was introduced across 
the continent, for example prohibiting night work for women and children, prohibiting child 
labour below certain ages, and introducing factory inspections. The period also saw the 
widespread introduction of old-age, sickness and unemployment insurance schemes. Moreover, 
this ‘labour compact’ was more widespread in the more open European economies. Huberman 
and Lewchuk use this evidence to argue that unions were persuaded to back free trade, or 
openness more generally, in return for pro-labour domestic policies. In related work, Huberman 
(2004) finds that working hours in Europe and her offshoots declined between 1870 and 1913 as a 
result of labour legislation and union pressure, and that the decline was greatest in small open 
economies such as Belgium, where the Labour Party supported free trade after 1885 (Huberman 
forthcoming). Not only did governments not indulge in a race to the bottom during the late 19th 
century globalization boom: in some cases governments cooperated so as to ensure a general 
raising of standards. Such was the case, for example, with the Franco-Italian labour accord of 
1904, which raised labour standards in Italy as a quid pro quo for granting Italian workers in 
France benefits which their French colleagues already enjoyed.  
 To some extent, therefore, late 19th century governments successfully managed the 
political challenges posed by globalization, sometimes defusing protectionist demands by means 
of domestic legislation, and sometimes giving in to them. World trade might have grown more 
slowly after 1914 than it did before, even had war not intervened, and the political challenges 
facing governments might have been exacerbated; but the 1920s and 1930s would have been 
utterly different had it not been for the Great War. 
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Table 1.1. European real trade 1870-1913 
 1870 (million 1990 $) Growth 1870-1913 
Austria 467 +333% 
Belgium 1,237 +492% 
Denmark 314 +376% 
Finland 310 +415% 
France 3,512 +222% 
Germany 6,761 +465% 
Italy 1,788 +158% 
Netherlands 1,727 +151% 
Norway 223 +283% 
Spain 850 +335% 
Sweden 713 +274% 
Switzerland 1,107 +418% 
UK 12,237 +222% 
Weighted average  +294% 
Weighted average, rest of the world   +379% 
Source: Maddison (2001) 
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Table 1.2. Exports plus imports as share of GDP  
 1870 1880 1890 1900 1913 
Austria 29.0% 25.5% 25.2% 26.8% 24.1% 
Belgium 35.6% 53.2% 55.6% 65.4% 101.4%
Denmark 35.7% 45.8% 48.0% 52.8% 61.5% 
Finland 31.7% 50.8% 39.3% 47.6% 56.2% 
France 23.6% 33.5% 28.2% 26.8% 30.8% 
Germany 36.8% 32.1% 30.1% 30.5% 37.2% 
Greece 45.6% 42.3% 39.4% 42.3% 29.4% 
Hungary 19.4% 23.7% 22.1% 22.3% 20.8% 
Italy 18.3% 18.3% 15.9% 19.0% 23.9% 
Netherlands 115.4% 100.5% 112.3% 124.1% 179.6%
Norway 33.9% 36.1% 43.6% 43.4% 50.9% 
Portugal 33.7% 43.8% 45.3% 48.9% 57.4% 
Russia  14.4% 15.0% 11.4% 13.8% 
Spain 11.7% 13.9% 19.2% 21.9% 22.7% 
Sweden 29.4% 37.3% 44.9% 39.4% 34.7% 
Switzerland  78.2% 81.9% 67.2% 64.5% 
UK 43.6% 46.0% 46.6% 42.4% 51.2% 
Best guess, European trade to GDP ratio 29.9% 33.4% 32.6% 31.9% 36.9% 
Idem, net of intra-European trade 9.2% 10.7% 10.8% 11.1% 13.5% 
 
Notes: Ottoman Empire, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia not included 
Source: Bairoch (1976), and data graciously provided by Leandro Prados de la Escosura. 
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Table 1.3. Foreign Investment of England, France and Germany, 1870 - 1913 
 
England France Germany
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1870 - 79 12.3% 4.0% 32.5% 23.9% 10.2% 
1880 - 89 12.2% 4.7% 38.5% 5.1% 18.8% 
1890 - 99 11.0% 3.4% 30.9% 16.5% 12.1% 
1900 - 09 12.6% 3.7% 29.4% 19.1% 8.3% 
1905 - 14 13.1% 6.5% 49.6% 17.3% 7.5% 
       
Net national 
wealth held 
overseas in 
1914 
32.1%   
Share of 
global foreign 
investment 
41.8% 19.8% 12.8% 
 
Sources: Edelstein (1982, 2004), Feis (1930), Jones & Obstfeld (2001), Lévy-Leboyer & 
Bourguignon (1990), Maddison (1995, 2003). 
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Table 1.4. Destination of English, French and German Foreign Investment 
1870 - 1913 
 
 England France Germany 
Europe    
Russia 3.4% 25.1% 7.7% 
Ottoman Empire 1.0% 7.3% 7.7% 
Austria-Hungary 1.0% 4.9% 12.8% 
Spain and Portugal 0.8% 8.7% 7.2% 
Italy 1.0% 2.9% 
Other Countries 2.5% 12.2% 17.9% 
Total (Europe) 9.7% 61.1% 53.3% 
Areas of recent settlement  
(outside Latin America)    
USA 20.5% 
Canada 10.1% 15.7% 
Australia 8.3% 
4.4% 
 
New Zealand 2.1%   
Total 41.0% 4.4% 15.7% 
Latin America    
Areas of recent settlement   
Argentina 8.6% 
Brazil 4.2% 
Total (areas of recent settlement) 53.8% 
Other countries  
Mexico 2.0% 
Chile 1.5% 
Uruguay 0.8% 
Cuba 0.6% 
13.3% 16.2% 
Total (Latin America) 17.7% 13.3% 16.2% 
Africa 9.1% 7.3% 8.5% 
Asia    
India 7.8% 
Japan 1.9% 
China 1.8% 
4.9% 4.3% 
Total (Asia) 11.5% 4.9% 4.3% 
Rest 11.0% 9% 2% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Colonies 16.9% 8.9% 2.6% 
Notes: Numbers for Russia and the Ottoman Empire include Asia. "Colonies" does not include 
Australia, Canada or New Zealand. 
Sources: Esteves (2007), Feis (1930), Stone (1999). 
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Table 1.5. Migration Rates by Decade (per 1000 mean population) 
 
Country 1851-60 1861-70 1871-80 1881-90 1891-00 1901-10 
 
European Emigration Rates 
 
Austria-Hungary   2.9 10.6 16.1 47.6 
Belgium    8.6 3.5 6.1 
British Isles 58.0 51.8 50.4 70.2 43.8 65.3 
Denmark   20.6 39.4 22.3 28.2 
Finland    13.2 23.2 54.5 
France 1.1 1.2 1.5 3.1 1.3 1.4 
Germany   14.7 28.7 10.1 4.5 
Ireland   66.1 141.7 88.5 69.8 
Italy   10.5 33.6 50.2 107.7 
Netherlands 5.0 5.9 4.6 12.3 5.0 5.1 
Norway 24.2 57.6 47.3 95.2 44.9 83.3 
Portugal  19.0 28.9 38.0 50.8 56.9 
Spain    36.2 43.8 56.6 
Sweden 4.6 30.5 23.5 70.1 41.2 42.0 
Switzerland   13.0 32.0 14.1 13.9 
 
Source:  Hatton and Williamson (1998: Table 2.1). 
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Figure 1.1.  Transport infrastructure, 1870-1913 
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Sources: Bairoch (1976), pp. 32 and 34. 
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Figure 1.2. Average annual extra-European emigration from Europe, 1846-1915 
(thousands) 
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Source: Kirk (1946), p. 279. Note: ‘Old’ consists of Britain and Ireland, Germany, Scandinavia, 
France, Switzerland and the Low Countries. ‘New’ consists of Italy, Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
Russian Empire, Iberia and the Balkans. 
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Figure 1.3. A stylised model of emigration 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hatton and Williamson (1988, p. 36). 
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Figure 1.4: The rise of the international scientific community 
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Sources: Union des Associations Internationales (1957,1960).  
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Figure 1.5. Wages relative to Britain, 1870-1913 
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Source: database underlying O'Rourke and Williamson (1999). 
  
 
